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Seventy quarterbacks were selected during six NFL drafts held 1999-2004.  This paper
analyzes information available prior to the draft (college, college passing statistics, NFL
Combine data) and draft outcomes (overall number picked and signing bonus).  Also analyzed
for these players are measures of NFL playing opportunity (games played, games started, pass
attempts) and measures of productivity (Pro Bowls made, passer rating, DVOA, and DPAR) for
up to the first seven years of each drafted player’s NFL career.  We find that more highly-drafted
QBs get significantly more opportunity to play in the NFL.  However, we find no evidence that
more highly-drafted QBs become more productive passers than lower-drafted QBs that see
substantial playing time.  Furthermore, QBs with more pass attempts in their final year of more
highly-ranked college programs exhibit lower NFL passing productivity. 
JEL Classification Codes: L83, J23, J42
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  Each April, the National Football League (NFL) conducts its annual player entry 
draft.  Most players chosen are from the approximately 120 “amateur” football programs 
that comprise the elite National College Athletic Association’s (NCAA’s) Division I-A.   
The 32 NFL teams take turns, primarily in reverse-order of the prior year’s competitive 
quality, choosing approximately 250 entering players annually; these players represent 
approximately the top 10% of the available entering “amateur” players.  While selected 
players may only negotiate a playing contract with the drafting team, the NFL draft does 
not create a purely monopsonistic situation.  The opportunity cost to a team that fails to 
reach an agreement with its draft choices is the loss the right to one-seventh or so of the 
team’s rights to acquire a top amateur player below his free-market value.  In a league in 
which the average playing career is very short, and with a “hard” cap for total team 
payroll, such a loss is significant.   
  The scarce access to top entering players created by the draft also implies that 
mistakes in the evaluation of entering players’ quality are costly.  Consequently, teams 
spend considerable resources attempting to gauge players’ likely future productivity.   
The primary question addressed by this paper concerns how effective teams are at 
drafting players of the quarterback position, widely held to be the most competitively 
influential single position on the field.   
  To this end, we have assembled a data set of approximately 3500 elite college 
football players who were eligible for the six NFL drafts held between 1999 and 2004.  
Approximately 1500 of these 3500 prospects actually were drafted, including 70 
quarterbacks (QBs), who, in addition to their salaries, were paid guaranteed signing   2
bonuses that totaled $45 million.  We characterize the eventual annual productivity of 
these quarterback draftees for their first three to seven years in the NFL in terms of:  
games played, games started, Pro Bowl (all-star game) rosters made, pass attempts and 
completions, passing yards, and touchdown passes.  We also consider three other 
measures of quarterback productivity:  “passer rating” (an official NFL index statistic), 
DPAR, and DVOA.  The latter two are indices created by the website 
footballoutsiders.com.  We find that how highly a quarterback is chosen in the draft has a 
significant impact on his likelihood of seeing game action, but is very poorly correlated 
with his on-field productivity.  We then offer some possible explanations for this finding. 
 
Background 
  The NFL's first regular season game is generally played on the first or second 
Sunday of September.  The sixteen-game regular season ends in early January, followed 
by the playoffs, culminating in early February with the Super Bowl, the league's 
championship game between the winners of its two conferences.  The NCAA College 
football schedule begins a bit earlier each year than does the NFL's, but is completed 
about the same time that the NFL playoffs begin.  An important difference between 
college and NFL football is that the players are considered to be amateurs, although the 
spirit of the term suffers mortal damage in practice.  NCAA players are only permitted 
four years of eligibility, although this matter also is subjected to supremely lawyerly 
interpretations of all forms.   
  Upon completion of one's college eligibility, a player may declare himself 
available for the NFL player entry draft, held in April of each year.  Some budding stars   3
declare themselves available for the draft while they still have some college eligibility 
remaining, but NFL rules only permit this if the player's age cohort has graduated from 
high school three or more years earlier. Two months before the draft each year, the top 
300 or so prospects are invited to a "Scouting Combine," at which each player is 
subjected to a variety of physical tests of strength, speed, and intelligence (Wonderlic 
test).  These results, along with the evaluations of in-house scouts and draft consulting 
firms, are used by teams in making their draft choices. 
  The draft consists of seven rounds, each in which all of the 32 teams is entitled 
to one pick, plus any "compensatory" picks.  Compensatory draft picks are awarded after 
rounds 3 to 7.  These are meant to compensate teams for certain kinds of free agent losses 
in accordance with the NFL collective bargaining agreement with the NFL Players 
Association.  Teams pick in reverse order of finish (ROF) of their prior-year competitive 
success; i.e., the team with the worst record the previous season chooses first in each 
round of the draft, followed by the second-worst, etc.; the Super Bowl winner picks last 
in each round.   ROF-assigned draft picks can be traded among teams for players already 
under contract, and other draft picks, so the actual number of picks by any team can be 
more or less than seven in any given draft.  Depending on the number of compensatory 
drafts awarded by the league, there are approximately 250 players drafted each year.   
   In accordance with the Invariance Principle (Rottenberg, 1956), there is 
substantial evidence in favor of fairly robust draft pick and player trading markets.  
Massey and Thaler (2005) identified 334 draft-day trades in the NFL, between 1987 and 
2004 – about 8% of all picks, or an average of nearly twenty per year.   Table 1 shows the 
number of picks in each round of the 2007 NFL draft that were not made by the ROF-  4
assigned team, along with the number of compensatory draft picks.  These markets, along 
with the relatively high degree of variability in teams’ between-season winning 
percentages, suggest that there is very little correlation between a team’s actual draft 
order and future winning.




  While there has been a great deal written about the NFL Draft and Combine in the 
popular sports press, there is relatively little about the topics in the sports economics 
literature.   Most notable are papers by Hendricks et al. (2003) and by Massey and Thaler 
(2005).   Hendricks et al. (2003) use the NFL as a test case for a general theory 
concerning labor market phenomena that result from uncertain measures of future 
productivity.   They find evidence that draftees from less visible college programs suffer 
from statistical discrimination in the earliest rounds of the draft when teams are likely to 
be risk-averse.  However, they also find that in later rounds, teams are more likely to 
select a player from a lesser known program.  In later rounds, when the stakes seem 
lower, teams apparently weigh the option value of drafting an unheralded future star more 
heavily than they do earlier in the draft. 
  Massey and Thaler (2005) compare the quality of predictions rooted in economic 
theory to those envisioned by psychological research; this is accomplished by examining 
the trading of draft picks among teams.  They find that top draft picks are overvalued by 
teams in a manner that is that is more consistent with the enduring decision-making 
                                                 
2 The average standard deviation of NFL teams’ series of winning percentages 1999-2006 = 0.168, 
equivalent to 2.7 games in a 16-game season.   5
biases suggested by psychology than by the economics of rational expectations and 
efficient markets. 
  McGee and Burkett (2003) consider the ability of Combine test results to predict 
the eventual round of the draft in which a player will be selected.  They analyze Combine 
data for 326 college players who entered the 2000 NFL Draft, running a series of 
apparently OLS regressions for each position type, using draft round on the left-hand side 
and Combine results on the right-hand side of the regressions.  They provide little detail 
of their regression analyses, reporting only coefficient estimates and R
2 values; they 
claim these R
2 values fall between 0.223 (LB) and 1.000 (WR, RB, and DB).   
  Mirabile (2005) analyzed 84 quarterbacks drafted and signed by NFL teams from 
1989-2004.   The OLS models estimated in the paper found no statistically significant 
relationship between the players' Wonderlic scores and their collegiate passing 
performances.  The paper also concluded that the Wonderlic test had no statistically 
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II. DATA 
  A data set describing the top 25 NFL QB prospects (as designated by the firm 
NFL Draft Scout) for each of the six NFL Drafts 1999-2004 was assembled for this 
paper.
3  Data for each prospect include the following:  the draft year, college program, 
final year college passing statistics, NFL Combine test results (height, weight, 40-yard 
time, 20-yard time, 10-yard time, bench reps, vertical jump height, broad jump length, 
cone test time, shuttle test time, and Wonderlic score), whether or not the player was 
drafted, the overall draft selection number for the player (if any), the drafting team and 
the player’s subsequent teams, the drafting team’s average winning percentage for the 
next four years, rookie year salary, signing bonus (if any), the number of games 
appearances in each of the player's first seven seasons in the NFL, the number of starts in 
each of the player's first seven seasons, whether or not the player earned a spot in the Pro 
Bowl roster in each of his first seven seasons, and three measures of NFL QB 
productivity (described below)
4   
  Combine results, college programs, and draft results were taken from NFL Draft 
Scout (2005, 2006), one of the services that collects information on college players that it 
considers "prospects" for each year's draft.
5  The source of salary, bonus, and team 
winning percentage information used here is Rodney Fort's Sports Business Data Pages 
website (Fort, 2005, 2006, 2007).  Game appearance and games started data were found 
                                                 
3 There were only 18 QB prospects identified for the 2001 draft. 
4 The data set only includes playing data 1999-2004; thus the full seven years of game appearances, starts 
and Pro Bowls is only available here for the players in the 1999 and 2000 drafts.  Six years of playing data 
are included for players in the 2001 draft, five years for players in the 2002 draft, etc. 
5 Note that not all prospects participate in the Combine, nor do all participants undergo every Combine 
evaluation.   7
in annual issues of the NFL Record & Fact Book (NFL, various years).  Pro Bowl rosters 
were taken from the Pro Football Reference website (pro-football-reference.com, 2006). 
  Players’’ final college year statistics were taken from the NCAA career statistics 
search page (NCAA, 2007) for the 2001 season and after, and from the individual 
schools’ programs websites (as available) for the 1998, 1999, and 2000 college seasons.  
These were used to calculate the player’s passer rating according to the NCAA formula.
6   
Each player’s college was identified either as belonging to a “BCS conference” or a 
“Non-BCS Conference” depending on whether or not the school’s conference was a 
participant in the Bowl Championship Series; such participation is associated with higher 
caliber of college football (and includes the independent Notre Dame University).  The 
relative strength of individual college programs was gauged by using the final Associated 
Press Division I-A college football rankings from 1992-2003 as reported by 
Shrpsports.com (shrpsports.com, 2007).  These data were used to construct a “college 
power ranking index.”
7  There were 74 schools that were represented at least once in the 
AP Top 25 1992-2003 (Table 2 and Figure 2).  This index is used here as a measure of 
the reputation of players’ college programs. 
  Players’ NFL statistics (passing attempts, completions, passing yards, and passing 
touchdowns) were taken from NFL.com (2007).  These were used to calculate the 
player’s passer rating according to the NFL method.
8  In addition, two relatively new 
measures of productivity developed by Football Outsiders were used:  DVOA and DPAR 
                                                 
6 The NCAA formula is: [ { (8.4 * yards) + (330 * touchdowns) - (200 * interceptions) + (100 * 
completions) } / attempts ].  (Stassen.com, 2007). 
7 The value of the index for each college is equal to the number of times the school’s football program 
finished in the Top 25, times 26 minus the average ranking when in the Top 25.  This captures quality in 
terms of ranking and endurance; higher index values are associated with more prestigious programs. 
8 A full description of the NFL passer rating can be found at http://www.nfl.com/news/981202qbrate.html.     8
(footballoutsiders.com, 2007).  DVOA is “defense-adjusted value over average” and 
DPAR is “defense-adjusted value over replacement.”  These are based on observations of 
specific play-by-play situational success rates as compared to the average across all NFL 




Pre-Draft QB Prospect Information  
  Table 3 compares both the drafted and undrafted top 25 QB prospects’ final year 
college passing statistics as well as some information about the college programs.  
Equality of means and equality of variance tests between the drafted and undrafted 
prospects were performed; the results of these are also shown in Table 3.  While final 
year college passer rating means were not significantly different between the two groups, 
the following means were significant:  final year passing yards and touchdowns, whether 
or not the player’s college was a BCS school, and the college’s power index. 
  Table 4 compares drafted and undrafted prospects’ NFL Combine results as well 
as equality of means and equality of variance tests.  Drafted QBs were slightly but 
significantly taller and heavier than undrafted top 25 QB prospects, but there was no 
significant difference in mean Wonderlic score, Body Mass Index (BMI), or forty-yard 
dash time between the two groups. 
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QB Draft Outcomes 
  Table 5 reports the drafting outcomes of the top 25 QB prospects for each of the 
1999-2004 NFL drafts.  This information is separated by top 10 picks overall, top 30 
picks (approximately the first round), and top 75 picks (approximately the first two 
rounds).  Overall, about half of the top 25 QB prospects in any given year are drafted, 
with one or two QBs typically taken among the top 10 picks overall.  Table 6 lists the 
college programs from which more than one QB was drafted during this period.     
  Those drafted in the first round or so negotiate signing bonuses that frequently 
exceed $1 million – clearly far above such players’ opportunity costs during the typical 
QB initial NFL contract length of about 4 or 5 years (Figure 3).  This result suggests that 
monopsony may not be a very good economic model of the early rounds of the draft.  
  Table 7 shows the results of a series of LOGIT models for which the dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the player was drafted, and zero if not.  The regressions 
generally indicate that players are more likely to be drafted if they are taller, faster, have 
more passing opportunities in their final college season, and perhaps come from a college 
program with a better football reputation.  However, apart from pass attempts during the 
final college year, OLS models of draft order (not included here) do not generally find 
significance with respect to these variables. 
    
Post-Draft Playing Opportunities 
  Most QBs drafted 1999-2004 got an opportunity to play in at least one NFL game, 
and nearly all QBs drafted among the top 75 picks overall were able to play (Table 8).  
Drafted QBs’ mean number of games played and games started during the first seven   10
years of their careers are shown in Table 9 and Figure 4.  Table 8 also includes the mean 
number of pass attempts by year.  Obviously, drafted QBs get a considerable amount of 
playing time on average. 
  NFL QB playing opportunities are correlated with draft position.   Figures 5, 6, 
and 7 show the average games played, games started, and pass attempts for those QBs 
drafted 1999-2002, respectively (i.e., those QBs for which there is at least five seasons of 
data).  Table 10 shows the results of OLS regressions against the natural log of overall 
draft pick number for average games played, games started, and pass attempts for all QBs 
drafted in the data set (1999-2004).
9  The coefficients and overall regressions are highly 
significant – more highly drafted QBs clearly got more opportunities to play in the NFL 
than those drafted lower. 
 
NFL Productivity Outcomes 
  Table 11, and Figures 8 and 9 show various measures of passer productivity by 
year in the league, as well as the percentage of drafted QBs that made a Pro Bowl roster.  
The measures used here are the NFL’s passer rating measure, as well as Football 
Outsiders’ DVOA and DPAR indices.  All three measures tell essentially the same story:  
QB performance peaks around Year 4 or 5, and begins to decline sometime thereafter.   
However, it should be noted, as shown by Figure 10, that less than two-thirds of QBs – 
even first-rounders - are still with the team that drafted them by in Year 5.  As suggested 
by Table 12, Super Bowl QBs can come from just about anywhere in the draft, but they 
on average have nearly six years of NFL experience. 
                                                 
9 These regressions were tested for heteroskedasticity using the White test (White, 1980); none was found 
at the 10% level.  Furthermore, censored (on the left at zero) TOBIT regressions were also run; they are not 
reported here, but gave coefficients and R
2 values very similar to those indicated in Table 9.   11
  Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 show the results of more systematic testing of the 
hypothesis that QBs drafted higher and paid higher signing bonuses are more productive.  
The OLS model results shown in Table 13 shows no evidence of any statistically 
significant relationship between NFL career passer rating (minimum 50 attempts) and 
either draft order or signing bonus (in $2007).
10   
Table 14 repeats these regressions using average season DVOA (minimum three 
seasons with minimum 100 pass attempts).  While there is some suggestion that a 
relationship between overall draft order and DVOA might exist, top 10 picks overall in 
the data set are significantly negatively associated with DVOA; i.e., the very top picks 
underperformed their peers, ceteris paribus.  While the coefficient on the overall draft 
order number is also counterintuitively negative, it is not significant.  Table 15 reports 
similar OLS regressions using DPAR as the dependent variable, and finds similar results, 
although DPAR is negatively and significantly associated with signing bonus.  Finally, 
Table 16 reports LOGIT regressions of a dummy variable =1 if the player ever made a 
Pro Bowl roster (0 otherwise).  The regressions indicate no significant relationship 
between making the Pro Bowl with neither overall draft order nor signing bonus. 
Table 17 breaks down QB draft choices and eventual NFL productivity by college 
conference.  The SEC and PAC 10 conferences saw the most quarterbacks drafted 
between 1999 and 2004, but they cannot boast the most productive quarterbacks.  Indeed, 
draftees from non-BCS schools – comprising about 30% of all draftees – showed 
significantly greater average NFL career passer ratings than did draftees from BCS 
schools (equality of means t = 2.28).  Average seasonal DVOA and DPAR were also 
                                                 
10 All the models in Tables 13-15 and in Table 18 were tested and corrected if necessary for 
heteroskedasticity at the 10% level in accordance with White (1980).   12
higher on average for the non-BCS draftee group, but the number of QBs with three or 
more seasons of at least 100 pass attempts was too small to find statistically significantly 
different means. 
The suggestion of BCS vs. non-BCS draftees from Table 17 is analyzed further in 
Table 18 wherein OLS regressions of draft pick number and career NFL passer rating are 
tested against college statistics and Combine data (among the top 25 QB prospects each 
year).  The regressions make the case that draft decisions seem to be overly reliant upon 
whether or not the draftee had a lot of passing attempts in his final season playing for a 
highly-ranked college program.  The NFL passer productivity does not support this 
reliance.  Furthermore, neither draft decisions nor productivity outcomes appear to be 
correlated with Combine measurements, calling into question why these measurements 




  We found that college QBs drafted in the 1999-2004 NFL drafts differ little from 
those not drafted among the top 25 QB prospects in any given year.  They are all larger-
than-average and exception athletes, although draftees are more likely to be slightly 
larger, have more pass attempts, and perhaps hail from better college programs than their 
undrafted counterparts among the top 25 prospects. 
   Our analysis suggests that QBs drafted earlier get significantly larger guaranteed 
signing bonuses and are given significantly more opportunity to play in the NFL than 
those chosen later.  However, there is very little or no support for the claim that earlier   13
draftees are any more productive passers than those from later rounds who get substantial 
playing time; in fact, QBs drafted among the top 10 picks overall may be significantly 
less productive passers than those chosen later who get substantial playing time.    This 
result cannot be explained with “higher draft picks play for lousier teams.”  Furthermore, 
prospects from more highly ranked college programs, who throw a lot of passes in their 
final college season, exhibit lower average NFL passer productivity.  Because of the great 
degree of pick trading and the natural high year-on-year variation in team winning 
percents, there is no significant relationship between where a team picks its QBs and its 
competitive success during the next four years. 
  Perhaps the 1999-2004 QB drafts were unusual in some way.  If not, then perhaps 
there is very little actual difference among the top college QB prospects in any given 
draft.  Any eventual productivity differences are more due to random events than 
significant talent differences.  However, this could not explain the reason why higher 
picks garner so much more opportunity to play.  Behavioral economics and psychology 
may be better suited to this phenomenon than rationality or randomness.   
  In any case, the QB draft may be more crapshoot than college job fair.  Because 
the top QB picks receive such large signing bonuses, but do not seem to be any more 
productive than those chosen later, perhaps teams would be better off trading down for 
later QB picks.     14
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No. of Picks 
Not Made by 
ROF Assigned 
Team 
Pct. of ROF 
PicksNnot 








Picks as Pct. of 
Total Picks 
1  10 31.3%  0  0% 
2  19 59.4%  0  0% 
3  10 31.3%  4  11.1% 
4  18 56.3%  6  15.8% 
5  11 34.4%  5  13.5% 
6  16 50.0%  4  11.1% 
7  11 34.4% 13 28.9% 
Total  95 42.4% 32 12.5% 
Note:  ROF = Reverse-Order-of-Finish  
 
 
Figure 1:  Relationship Between Team QB Draft Order and Winning Percentage 
Mean Team QB Draft Pick Number vs. Mean Team Win Pct in 4 
Years Following Draft, 1999-2004 NFL Drafts
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Table 2:  Top 25 Colleges in terms of Power Ranking Index 








Florida State  12 6.08  239 
Florida  11 7.55  203 
Nebraska  11 7.64  202 
Miami-FL  11 9.36  183 
Michigan  12 11.58  173 
Tennessee  10 9.40  166 
Ohio State  9 7.78  164 
Kansas State  9 12.22  124 
Penn  8 11.25  118 
Georgia  9 13.33  114 
Alabama  7 10.14  111 
Colorado  7 10.57  108 
Texas  9 14.78  101 
Oklahoma  5 6.40  98 
Notre Dame  7 12.86  92 
Texas A&M  7 13.29  89 
Washington  7 14.00  84 
Auburn  7 14.57  80 
Virginia Tech  7 14.57  80 
LSU  5 11.20  74 
USC  4 7.50  74 
Oregon  5 11.40  73 
Wisconsin  4 9.75  65 
N. Carolina  5 13.20  64 
Washington State  4 10.75  61 
 








Figure 2:  College Power Ranking Indices in Descending Order 
College Power Ranking Index in Descending Order 







1 4 7 1 01 31 61 92 22 52 83 13 43 74 04 34 64 95 25 55 86 16 46 77 07 3













































Table 3:  Summary of Drafted and Undrafted Top 25 QB Prospects’  
Final Year of College Statistics, 1999-2004 NFL Drafts 





































































































































Pr(F)  0.947 0.176  0.827  0.479  0.147 0.466 
Notes:  “Top 25 Prospects” according to ranking by NFL Draft Scout.  ** =  Significant 
at the 5% level 
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Table 4:  Summary of Drafted and Undrafted Top 25 QB Prospects’ 
Selected Combine Results, 1999-2004 NFL Drafts 










All Top 25 
Prospects 
25.51 74.23  219.36  27.91  4.86 
Prospects 
Drafted 














No. Drafted   66 69  70  70  67 
No. Not 
Drafted  
50 73  73  73  72 
Equality of 
Means t 
0.983 2.91**  2.39**  0.531 1.03 
Pr(t)  0.328 0.004  0.020  0.597  0.31 
Equality of 
Variance F 
1.24 1.16  1.59  1.56  1.07 
Pr(F)  0.43 0.648  0.052  0.062  0.778 
Note:  ** = Significant at the 5% level 
 
 

























1999  25 52.0% 13  3 3  5  6 
2000  25 48.0% 12  0 0  1  3 
2001  18 55.6% 10  1 1  1  4 
2002  25 36.0% 9  2 2  2  3 
2003  25 48.0% 12  1 2  4  4 

















Note:  Mean overall pick number for QBs drafted 1999-2004 = 119.2 
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Table 6:  Colleges from which Multiple QBs were Drafted, 1999-2004 
School 
No. Drafted  
1999-2006 School 
No. Drafted  
1999-2006 
LSU 4  Kansas  State  2 
Michigan 4  Kentucky  2 
Oregon 4  Louisiana  Tech  2 
BYU 3  Louisville  2 
Florida 3 Marshall  2 
Ohio State  3  Miami (FL)  2 
Tennessee 3  Michigan  State  2 
Tulane 3  Mississippi  2 
Washington 3  Notre  Dame  2 
Boston College  2  Sam Houston State  2 
Cal Davis  2  South Carolina  2 
Central Florida  2  Stanford  2 
Florida AM  2  Texas  2 
Fresno State  2  Texas Tech  2 
Iowa State  2  Virginia  2 
 
 
Figure 3:  Signing Bonus vs. Draft Pick Number 
Real Signing Bonus ($2007) vs. Overall Draft Pick Number, NFL 
QBs Drafted 1999-2004


































Note: Figure does not show Carson Palmer’s $10 million signing bonus in 2003. 
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Table 7:  LOGIT MODELS:  Dependent Variable = 1 if Drafted, 0 if Not Drafted 
 
  LOGIT 1  LOGIT 2  LOGIT 3  LOGIT 4
















Weight  0.296 
(1.31) 
    


























    









(Passer Rating x College Power 
Index)/10000 
     7.84 
(1.25) 
McFadden R  0.255 0.155  0.185  0.352 
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*   = significant at 10% level 










that Played in 



















81.4%  18.6% 82.2% 17.8%  70 
Top 75 Picks  95.8%  4.2% 95.8% 4.2%  24 
Mean Pick 
Number 
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Year 1  3.557 2.229  148.42  70 
Year 2  5.500 4.000  193.54  70 
Year 3  5.729 4.614  227.47  70 
Year 4  5.107 4.304  294.73  56 
Year 5  5.045 4.386  254.45  44 
Year 6  3.800 3.543  286.92  35 
Year 7  3.240 3.160  384.86  35 
 
 
Figure 4:  Drafted QBs:  Mean Annual Games Played and Started 
Mean Games Played and Games Started vs. Yrs in 
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Figure 5:  Mean Games Played per Season vs. Draft Pick, QBs Drafted 1999-2002 
Mean GP per Season vs Draft Pick No.,
 NFL QBs Drafted 1999-2002








































Figure 6:  Mean Games Started per Season vs. Draft Pick, QBs Drafted 1999-2002 
Mean GS per Season vs. Draft Pick No., 
NFL QBs Drafted 1999-2002
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Figure 7:  Mean Pass Attempts per Season vs. Draft Pick, QBs Drafted 1999-2002 
Mean Pass Attempts per Season vs. Draft Pick No.,
NFL QBs Drafted 1999-2002















































Table 10:  OLS Regression Results, QBs Drafted 1999-2004 
  Dep Var =  
Mean Games 
Played per Season 
Dep Var =  
Mean Games 
Started per Season 

















2  0.532 0.600  0.575 
Adj R
2  0.525 0.594  0.558 
F  77.2 101.9  32.5 
Pr(F)  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
N  70 70  26 
 
 
   27






No. in Pro 
Bowl? 







100 passes)  Obs 
Year 1  58.22  4  5.71%  -18.10  -11.08  11 
Year 2  69.37  1  1.43%  -13.79  9.77  23 
Year 3  78.10  4  5.71%  -0.47  15.55  20 
Year 4  66.63  5  8.93%  6.99  19.62  12 
Year 5  74.13  4  9.09%  12.75  39.65  9 
Year 6  80.53  1  2.86%  23.34  81.64  5 
Year 7  82.67  0  0.00%  -20.12  6.18  5 
 
 
Figure 8:  DVOA vs. Years in NFL 
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Figure 9:  DPAR vs. Years in NFL 























Figure 10:  Percent of Drafted QBs Still with Drafting Team  
by Years Following Draft 
 




































Top 10 Picks Top 30 Picks Top 75 Picks All QBs Drafted
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Table 12:  NFL Super Bowl QBs 1999-2006 Seasons 
 










Mean Years of NFL Experience for 





Table 13:  OLS Models Career of Passer Rating vs. Draft Order and Signing Bonus 










ln(overall pick no.)  -2.50 
(-2.51) 





   
Top 10 Pick 
dummy 
   9.30 
(1.53) 
  
Top 30 Pick 
dummy 
     3.63 
(0.715) 
 
Top 75 Pick 
dummy 
       5.83 
(1.24) 
R
2  0.070 0.014  0.046  0.010  0.030 
N  42 40  51  51  51 
Heteroskedasticity-
Corrected? 
Yes No  No  No  No 
Notes:  
Dependent Variable = Career NFL Passer Rating, minimum 50 passing attempts. 
t-values in parentheses. 
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Table 14:  OLS Models of DVOA vs. Draft Order and Signing Bonus 










ln(overall pick no.)  3.96 
(1.84)* 





   
Top 10 Pick 
dummy 
   -17.1 
(-2.26)** 
  
Top 30 Pick 
dummy 
     -1.44 
(-0.161) 
 
Top 75 Pick 
dummy 
       -8.97 
(-0.840) 
R
2  0.206 0.107  0.282  0.002  0.051 
N  15 15  15  15  15 
Heteroskedasticity-
Corrected? 
No No  No  No  No 
Notes:  
Dependent Variable = Mean DVOA for season, minimum 3 seasons with 
minimum 100 pass attempts. 
t-values in parentheses. 
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Table 15:  OLS Models of DPAR vs. Draft Order and Signing Bonus 










ln(overall pick no.)  6.01 
(2.14)* 





   
Top 10 Pick 
dummy 
   -20.7 
(-1.57) 
  
Top 30 Pick 
dummy 
     0.274 
(0.018) 
 
Top 75 Pick 
dummy 
       -31.1 
(-1.92)* 
R
2  0.183 0.383  0.152  0.0000  0.236 
N  14 12  14  14  14 
Heteroskedasticity-
Corrected? 
Yes No  Yes  No  No 
Notes:  
Dependent Variable = Mean DPAR for season, minimum 3 seasons with 
minimum 100 pass attempts. 
t-values in parentheses. 




Table 16:  LOGIT Models of Pro Bowl Rosters Made vs. Draft Order  
and Signing Bonus 
 




















Dependent Variable = Did player ever make a Pro Bowl roster? (dummy=1 if yes)  
z-values in parentheses. 
* = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level.   32
 




























SEC 13  112.4  117.0  1  62.6  11  -0.5  -1.3  4 
PAC 10  9  65.9  19.0  1  55.3  7  -11.6  0.8  1 
ACC 8  129.6  147.0  1  68.4  5  7.0  31.0  3 
Big 10  7  153.4  192.0  32  61.0  6  19.4  32.7  2 
Big 12  7  167.0  177.0  97  74.7  3      0 
C-USA 7  35.4  22.0  7  78.7  7  9.3  40.8  4 
Big East  4  78.5  81.5  2  67.4  3  6.3  41.4  1 
Southland 3  142.7  164.0  81  63.1  3  - -  0 
WAC 3  185.7  212.0  106  67.7  3  -  -  0 
MAC 2  99.0  99.0  11  87.9  1  -  -  0 
MWC 2  200.5  200.5  151  95.1  1  -  -  0 
A10 1  65.0  65.0  65  -  0  - - 0 
D-III 1  186.0  186.0  186  -  0 -  - 0 
MEAC 1  205.0  205.0  205  -  0 -  - 0 
ND 1  214.0  214.0  214  -  0 -  - 0 
SWAC 1  195.0  195.0  195  -  0 -  - 0 
Big Sky  0  -  -  -  61.0  1  -  -  0 
             
Non-BCS 21  118.2  108.0  7  74.2  16  9.3  40.8  4 
BCS 49  119.6  117.0  1  63.1  35  4.8  19.7  11 
All   70  119.2  113.5  1  66.6  51  6.0  25.7  15 
 
Note:  DVOA and DPAR are seasonal averages, reported only for those QBs with at least 
  three seasons with 100 pass attempts.  ND = Notre Dame.  D-III = NCAA 
 Division  III.   33
Table 18:  OLS Models of Draft Pick and Career NFL Passer Rating vs. 
College Statistics and Combine Data 
 
































































































2  0.290 0.352 0.161 0.190  0.0880  0.191 
F  3.090** 2.605** 2.839** 2.142**  2.120  3.533** 
N  44 30 64 46 47 33 
Heteroskedasticity-
Corrected? 
Yes No Yes No No No 
Notes:   
  College statistics for final college season.   
  Career Passer Rating is for NFL career, minimum 50+ career attempts. 
t-values in parentheses. 
* = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level. 
 